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International securities markets have grown to be as large and vibrant as
they are in part because the participants in those markets are not interested
in regulation. Indeed, I have often thought that the ideal jurisdiction for most
of these participants would be a kind of floating tropical island which has no
taxing authority, no securities and exchange commission, no government
prosecutors of any kind, and no self-regulatory organizations such as stock
exchanges. But when these participants find havens from regulation, the
greed that tends to propel the capital markets usually leads to abuses. The
markets then are rocked by scandal, and there is a search for some sort of
regulation to give investors the confidence that they generally seek in order
to put their money into capital markets. Here I suppose my biases as a
former SEC Commissioner and a present New York Stock Exchange Direc-
tor are going to come out. It is my view that some amount of effective
regulation is necessary to inspire the investor confidence necessary for the
kinds of markets that both traders and investors-whether institutional
investors or individual investors-need and want.
As a former SEC Commissioner, I had the privilege of going to Paris and
London to discuss SEC regulation with various participants in those Euro-
pean markets. This was at a time when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
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had just been passed and there was great controversy, not only about that
statute and all the SEC investigations that had preceded it, but also about
some extremely controversial proposals for foreign issuer disclosure. I was
subject to a barrage of criticism concerning the SEC and particularly its
enforcement division. Nevertheless, at one dinner, after which I silently
listened to all this adverse comment, one of the Swiss bankers who had been
most vocal in his criticism said, "Of course, the thing about the United
States markets that we envy so much is that you have the only marketplace
in the world where the players have their cards above the table; that's what
makes it such a good market." The international markets today are
sufficiently mature so that there is a need for this kind of openness, or as the
English call it, this kind of "transparency". in securities trading. To express
this needed quality in terms of the American regulatory concepts, sufficient
laws and regulations are necessary to insure fair and equitable trading
markets.
There are, however, numerous difficulties in establishing any sort of
regulatory system for the international securities markets. I will now briefly
touch upon a few of the most important problems. Probably the most
important barriers to any system of international regulation of the securities
markets are the lack of any worldwide regulatory authority either to promul-
gate or to enforce a system of regulation, and the lack of any force to compel
the different authorities that do exist in different countries to play by the
same rules. There are international associations of stock exchanges. There
also is an international association of securities commissions and similar
regulators. These organizations, however, exist primarily for the purpose of
mutual education and assistance. They have not developed to the point
where they can propose or enforce regulations for the conduct of interna-
tional securities trading. This would involve delicate problems of
sovereignty, and it would also require some harmonization of very different
regulatory systems among countries which have major capital markets.
Moreover, even if those countries could agree as to how the primary or main
capital markets should be regulated, there would then need to be some
agreement on the part of countries with developing economies to accept and
abide by the regulations that might be developed by the countries with major
financial or capital centers.
Even within the United States we have had enormous difficulty establish-
ing a national market system pursuant to the 1975 directive of Congress
which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and ordered the SEC
and the self-regulatory organizations to develop such a marketplace. In part,
this has been because of problems in harmonizing exchange and over-the-
counter trading systems. In part, it is because of the political problems in
harmonizing the interests of various groups participating in the trading
markets. Just as no one voluntarily gives up sovereignty or jurisdiction, no
one willingly gives up market share. Harmonization efforts require political
and economic compromise. Accordingly, there needs to be some perceived
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self-interest and long-term gain in order for participants to negotiate effec-
tive regulatory arrangements.
There are also specific differences in trading and legal systems that pose
barriers to the international regulation of capital markets. First, there are
very different trading systems both extant in the United States itself, and
between other countries and the United States. The United States has two
models. One model, which prevails on the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Stock Exchange, and some other exchanges, features the unitary
exchange specialist. In this kind of system the specialist, as an agent,
executes orders left with him by other members of an exchange and, in
addition, may execute orders as a principal to maintain a fair and orderly
market. The second model is the over-the-counter dealer market, in which
competing traders and dealers, acting as principals, negotiate securities
prices. Most debt securities in the United States and in the Euromarket are
traded in such an over-the-counter market.
In Japan there is a rather different system altogether that prevails on the
floor of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. There, a system exists in which agency
orders are transmitted to Satori members and matched for execution. Satori
members may not receive orders from public customers nor trade for their
own accounts. There is neither an auction nor a dealer system, although
most orders are executed according to certain auction principles such as
time and price priority.
The United Kingdom, until the present time, has had a single capacity
system on the London Stock Exchange. Securities have been traded accord-
ing to a system of brokers and jobbers, which has meant that agency and
principal functions have been required to be conducted by separate firms.
Although the unfixing of commission rates in London does not by law
compel the English to go to a dual capacity system, they are going to do so
because there is a feeling that the single capacity system cannot withstand
the unfixing of commission rates. Now in a dual capacity system there is no
separation of agency and principal trading. The London Stock Exchange has
recognized that this creates new conflict of interest problems, and that there
is a need now for order exposure and United States sale information.
Otherwise there may not be adequate transparency or publicly available
information on trades for investors to determine whether or not they have
received fair executions.
I have alluded to the problem of availability of information. In the United
States, current quotation and last sale information is available on a real time
basis. Also, there is disclosure by public companies of market sensitive
corporate information. In order for the international markets to be linked,
equivalent information and disclosure systems need to be developed in other
countries. Yet, to date neither has there been the regulatory system to
compel or even encourage that kind of disclosure, nor has the economic
need been felt for participants to make this sort of disclosure voluntarily.
Another very important difference is the differing legal systems of coun-
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tries that have major capital markets. For example, in the United States we
have statutes that compel a separation of investment and commercial bank-
ing, whereas in Europe there is universal banking. In the United States we
have a system of self-regulatory organization oversight of the stock ex-
changes and the securities industry. In the United Kingdom, the London
Stock Exchange has regulated trading with no real government oversight.
Now the United Kingdom is heading toward a system of self-regulation that
probably will have some commonality with the American system, except
that the United Kingdom is very resistant to having a government presence
like the SEC to compel effective self-regulation. Because of the unique
American system of regulation and oversight by the SEC and self-regulatory
organizations, problems in the international governance of the trading mar-
kets are difficult to resolve now, and probably will continue to be difficult to
resolve. In some countries, the primary regulator is the stock exchange,
which is a private self-regulatory organization. In the United States the
primary regulator is the SEC-an independent government agency which
oversees the stock exchanges and the NASD. Generally, with regard to
international cooperation and regulation, an entity which is a private self-
regulatory organization, such as an exchange in a country other than the
United States, does not really want to work in cooperation. with a United
States government agency because there is a fear of governmental interfer-
ence and sovereignty issues. At the same time it is difficult to accomplish
certain things on a government-to-government basis because of the need to
include the United States self-regulatory organizations in any system of
effective oversight. I do not believe the United States is going to succeed in
persuading countries such as the United Kingdom or Japan, which are major
players in the capital markets, to agree to a legal or regulatory system that is
anywhere near as complex as the system that we have in the United States.
In this connection I should mention the fifty blue-sky securities commis-
sions in the various states. In connection with a variety of proposals for
international cooperation, such as the SEC concept release on simultaneous
distribution of securities in different countries, even the SEC can become
hamstrung in trying to harmonize its regulations with the regulations of other
countries because of the problems of compliance with the blue-sky laws of
the fifty states.
Another difference in the legal systems is the reliance on litigation to
protect investors in the United States. In the United Kingdom the laws
generally provide for criminal rather than civil enforcement and, therefore,
prosecution is rare. In general, the Japanese simply do not favor litigation as
a means to redress injuries.
In the United States we have developed the inter-market trading system
("ITS") in response to the congressional directive for a national market
system. Whether this kind of a linkage of various domestic markets will
provide a model for international linkages time will tell, but again I will note
there are no super-regulatory agencies to compel the kind of cooperation
that was necessary among various United States exchanges in order to
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develop the ITS. Another difference in legal standards is the barriers to
access that exist in many foreign countries to the entry of United States
financial institutions into the foreign markets. This has been particularly true
in Japan where many American firms have been trying for years to join the
Tokyo Stock Exchange.*
Recently the SEC came out with two different requests for comments
concerning, on the one hand, the internationalization of the securities mar-
kets in relation to offerings, and on the other, the internationalization of the
securities markets in relation to trading.
Obviously, there is a serious problem regarding international enforcement
of any sort of anti-fraud provisions designed to ensure market integrity.
There are few surveillance or enforcement mechanisms in place to safeguard
the integrity of securities trading conducted simultaneously in multiple
international markets. As the global market becomes more developed, fraud
or manipulation in multiply-listed securities may adversely affect the market
for those securities in a variety of different jurisdictions. In general, the SEC
has taken the approach of trying to police the international markets by
attempting to extend its jurisdiction, both with respect to its power to obtain
information regarding certain foreign activities and with respect to enforcing
American securities laws more or less on a worldwide basis.
One of the more controversial proposals that the SEC has come out with
in recent years is the "waiver by conduct" concept. Under this proposal, a
purchase or sale of securities from abroad in a United States market would
constitute an implied consent to disclosure of information and evidence
relevant to the transaction for purposes of any SEC enforcement action. The
legal predicate for this theory is an extension of state long-arm statutes to the
international arena. The proposal, however, has been severely criticized,
both within the United States and abroad, so it is doubtful whether this
particular proposal will become the law. At the same time, the problem of
obtaining evidence in other countries is a very real one, not only for the
SEC, but also for other agencies.
Information is a very real problem, and it is unclear whether it can be
solved by treaty or through international negotiation. Sooner or later it may
be possible that some heavy-handed approach, like waiver by conduct, will
be adopted not only by United States regulators, but by the regulators in
other mature capital markets who really do not want the markets in their
countries to be manipulated by investors in situations where the regulators
cannot obtain any information about who has been trading in what securi-
ties.
* Ed: Several months after this conference, the Tokyo Stock Exchange awarded
six exchange seats to foreign firms. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith, Goldman
Sachs, and Morgan Stanley are the three American firms that have been awarded
seats. Joining the three American firms will be Vickers da Costa, Ltd. (the London-
based affiliate of Citicorp), S.G. Warburg & Co. of London, and Jardine Fleming
(Securities) Ltd. of Hong Kong. Wall St. Journal, Jan. 31, 1986 at 24, col. 1.
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